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industrial wineries producing wines that could be branded. Differences
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RESUMEN
En las tres de´cadas anteriores a la I Guerra Mundial, la calidad de la uva y
la naturaleza de la demanda del mercado jugaron un papel determinante en
la estructura organizativa de la industria del vino. En contraste con Europa,
donde el cultivo de la uva y la produccio´n del vino fueron actividades
especializadas, en el Nuevo Mundo la produccio´n y venta del vino estuvieron
integradas verticalmente. Esto favorecio´ la aparicio´n de grandes industrias
vinı´colas, que producı´an vinos de marca. Las diferencias dentro del Nuevo
Mundo pueden ser atribuidas a la naturaleza de la demanda, en especial
cuando el vino fue considerado un artı´culo de consumo primario (Argentina),
o cuando competı´a con otras bebidas alcoho´licas ma´s populares tales como la
cerveza y los alcoholes graduados (Australia y California).
Palabras clave: dotacio´n de factores vinı´colas, organizacio´n de empresas,
integracio´n vertical, Nuevo Mundo siglo XIX, produccio´n de uvas, produccio´n
de vino comercial, cambio de mercancı´as
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the interest of the early European settlers, commercial wine
production in the New World only developed in the late 19th century in
response to growing urban demand, improved transportation and new
winemaking technologies. By 1914, the industry was well established in a
number of countries, and contemporaries noted that it had developed very
differently from the situation in the Old World. In particular, the new large-
scale wineries were dependent in a way that was not the case in Europe
on specialist grape producers. Wine producers were much more involved
in marketing, and wines were often sold under brand names. Important
differences also existed among New World producers themselves, especially
with respect to the marketing and distribution of wine. In California, a
handful of large San Francisco merchants cornered the market and created
a hierarchical organization, integrating horizontally and vertically and
investing heavily in advertising and brands to sell to the East Coast mer-
chants directly. This producers’ organization, the California Wine Associa-
tion, controlled at one time about 80 per cent of the State’s wine sales,
making it one of the world’s largest wine businesses. By contrast, a British
importer, Peter Burgoyne, created a buyer’s organization that distributed
two-thirds of Australian exports, and attempts by the South Australian
government to create a state-led marketing board in London had only limited
success. Although the Argentine industry was dominated by a dozen or so
wine-makers, they suffered from weak brands as the Italian and Spanish
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immigrants were much less interested in quality than low prices. These firms,
however, sold huge quantities of wine in a market where annual per capita
consumption reached 60 litres by 1914, compared with just 2 litres in the
United States and five in Australia.
This paper argues that the nature of demand was crucial in explaining the
organization of the commodity chain and, with the exception of Australia,
this was limited to the domestic market. Section 1 looks at some of the
different theories to explain why firms integrate vertically rather than rely on
market transactions and the nature and degree of asset specificity found
in the wine industry. The next section shows how exogenous changes in
the period between 1870 and 1914 changed traditional viti-viniculture and
encouraged its rapid growth in the New World. The excellent grape growing
conditions led to the appearance of specialist growers in the region, which,
together with the growing economies of scale found in winemaking, changed
the relative asset specificity of the vineyard and winery. The differences
within the New World itself are then explained in the rest of the article.
Sections 3 and 4 look at California and Australia, where beer and spirits were
more popular among consumers than wine, and section 5 looks at Argentina,
which enjoyed New World production conditions and a market with southern
European consumer habits.
2. FROM THE VINE TO THE GLASS: WINE’S VALUE CHAIN
A number of distinct business activities were involved in the creation and
sale of wines. Land had to be cleared, vineyards planted and growers had to
wait 3 or 4 years before the first harvest. Grapes then had to be collected,
crushed and the must fermented. The wines were then usually matured,
blended and classified for sale and, when production took place at a distance
from where they were to be consumed, transportation and distribution networks
were also required.
These different activities made up the «value chain», but the wide
diversity of wines produced could result in them being carried out by five or
six separate business entities or being integrated into just one or two firms.
This paper deals with cheap wines, especially beverage wines (vino comu´n),
which, in areas where wine consumption was an integral part of the national
diet, such as Argentina, Italy, France or Spain, accounted for at least 90 per
cent of production. It ignores the highly specific chains associated with fine
table wines such as claret or champagne1. The production of vino comu´n was
organized very differently across countries. In Europe, grape growing and
1 In some fine wine regions such as Champagne or Burgundy, grape growing and winemaking
were also often specialist activities. For a detailed discussion of these different chains, see Simpson
(forthcoming). Centro Vitivinı´cola Nacional (1910, p. xx) and Pacific Rural Press (December 14,
1901, p. 372) for the very limited amount of fine wine produced. Cheap dessert wines (port, sherry)
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winemaking was integrated in a single, small family business, and marketing
was carried out by merchants. In the New World, by contrast, grape pro-
duction was a specialist activity, but winemaking and marketing were often
integrated in the same firm.
In his classic article, Robert Coase explained organizational differences
using what has become known as the transaction cost theory. For Coase,
firms exist because the cost of organizing production for the entrepreneur is
less than the cost of using the market mechanism (Coase 1937; Holmstro¨m
and Roberts 1998, p. 73). The transaction costs associated with using
the market relate to problems of information and commitment and,
according to Holmstro¨m and Roberts (1998, p. 74), «the most influential
work during the last two decades on why firms exist, and what determines
their boundaries, has been centered on what has come to be known as
the «hold-up problem»». This occurs when assets are highly specific and
trading partners attempt «to appropriate some of the returns that the assets’
owners expected when they invested in them» (Roberts 2004, p. 91). Vertical
integration is predicted to be more likely «when assets are specific, when
transactions are complex, and uncertainty is important» (Lafontaine and
Slade 2007, p. 653)2. Three assets in particular are important for this paper:
the vines, the winery and the brand names under which the wine was
sold. This led to three areas where activities were either fully integrated or
required vertical coordination (or «co-operation» as contemporaries called
it): the link between the grape grower and wine-maker; that between the
wine-maker and wholesalers; and finally in Australia between the exporter
and (British) importer.
The development of commercial wine production in the New World
from the 1890s presented small family growers with a major dilemma:
whether to specialize in grape production with its associate dependence
on the wine-maker, or to invest themselves in winemaking facilities,
despite the increasing barriers to entry associated with the capital and
knowledge requirements embodied in the new technologies. The posses-
sion of small private wineries offered growers some independence, but
they faced both higher production costs and produced poorer quality
wines than the new commercial wineries. These new wineries had a much
larger capacity than the traditional ones and required grapes from the
equivalent of perhaps twenty or thirty times what a family vine-grower
could produce, presenting their owners with a strategic decision as to
whether to integrate backwards into grape production or purchase from
independent suppliers.
(F’note continued)
became increasingly important in Australia and the United States from the turn of the century, but
these reinforced the changes described below for table wines.
2 See also Klein et al. (1998), Holmstro¨m and Roberts (1998) and Roberts (2004).
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Selling wines required other organizational decisions. In the first instance,
New World producers were located far from a number of their major markets:
the East Coast for California; the British market for Australia; and Buenos
Aires for Mendoza. Second, in the first two countries, consumers were often
unacquainted with wine, and producers had to compete with other alcoholic
beverages. Finally, the widespread adulteration and fraudulent labelling of
food and beverages in the late 19th century was especially common with wine,
which created considerable information asymmetries along the chain.
The question of who controlled and benefited from the value created varied
according to the type of wine and the nature of the commodity chain. At one
extreme, power in the value chains could be concentrated at two very different
points (Gereffi 1994, p. 104). In agriculture, there are often literally millions of
producers, with production carried out in many countries, making it easier for
importers to dominate the trade by creating standardized products and investing
in branding and marketing. By the late 19th century, a few very large companies
dominated a number of food and beverage buyer-driven commodity chains in
the British and U.S. markets (Heinz, Quaker Oats, Cadbury, etc.)3. By contrast,
producer-driven chains are controlled by core firms «at the point of production»
and include such products as aircrafts and computers. Producer-driven chains
are unusual with agricultural commodities, although the limited supply of top-
quality land and high production costs created barriers that allowed a highly
specialized producer such as Moe¨t & Chandon to control its chain.
In fact, fine wines in 19th century Europe were branded in a wide variety
of ways, including that of the producer (e.g. Chaˆteau Margaux), the shipper
(Sandeman) or the retailer (Victoria Wine Company in the United Kingdom).
By contrast, the major differences in quality found over relatively small
geographical areas and from one harvest to the next made it almost impos-
sible to create brands to sell cheap table wine in Europe. Instead, it was the
retailer’s reputation that determined consumer choice. In the New World,
however, the much greater homogeneity of grape quality and the new
winemaking technologies allowed, in theory, fully fermented quality table
wines with similar characteristics to be consistently produced each year in
large geographical areas, thus making the branding of ordinary table wines a
realistic possibility. Who put the brand and controlled the value chain is
discussed in sections 3-5 below.
3. GRAPE GROWING AND WINEMAKING: A TALE OF TWO WORLDS
In the mid-19th century, the wine industry in both Europe and the New
World was small scale. By 1914, this was still generally true for Europe but
3 For the difficulties in establishing buyer-driven commodity chains in the British wine market,
see Simpson (2004).
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not so in the New World where large industrial wine producers dominated
the sector. Four major exogenous events changed the industry during this
half century: the integration of national and, to a lesser extent, international
markets; the development of new political institutions and the ability of some
pressure groups to solve collective action problems and mobilize political
power; the appearance of new vine diseases and the production shortages
they created; and advances in the knowledge of fermentation processes and
development of winemaking equipment that produced economies of scale
and allowed cheap table wines to be produced in hot climates. After discussing
how each event influenced the business environment, the organization and
growth of the New World industry is considered in detail.
Arthur Young (1794, pp. 2, 25) noted for France in the late 1780s that
the cultivation of the vine depended «almost entirely on manual labour-
ydemanding no other capital than the possession of the land and a pair of
arms; no carts, no ploughs, no cattle»4. Vines were almost always worked by
their owners, as entry costs were low, there were few economies of scale and
the vine could be grown competitively on small plots of land marginal to
other crops. Wage labour was rarely used because output was very sensitive
to the quality and timing of labour inputs, and vines could be easily and
permanently damaged if the pruning, plowing and hoeing operations were
badly carried out (Galassi 1992, pp. 78-83; Hoffman 1984)5.
In Europe, the weather, pests and vine diseases influenced the size and
quality of the harvest, especially in the colder and damper areas of the north.
Wine was abundant and excellent one year but scarce or undrinkable the
next. Grapes had to be processed quickly because they were easily damaged
or diseased, and therefore family growers also made their own wine. Further-
more, although «fine» wines might improve with age, the great majority of
table wines had a very short «shelf» life. Those that had been poorly made or
stored quickly become diseased and undrinkable. In France, during the
second half of the 19th century, there were reportedly 1.5 million growers,
but most families dedicated part of their labour and land to other activities
because of the risky nature of production.
The demand constraints placed on the industry were significantly reduced
during the second half of the 19th century by a combination of cheap
transport, urbanization and rising incomes. Railways helped push Europe’s
wine frontier southwards and allowed growers to specialize in the Midi
(France), La Mancha (Spain) and Puglia (Italy), regions long known to
contemporaries as being especially suitable for the vine. In France, for
example, rising living standards led to consumption per capita increasing
4 The version used here is the second chapter on «vines» of the Bury St Edmonds edition.
5 Rental contracts were very rare as tenants might be tempted to increase short-term output at
the expense of reducing the productive life of the vine, while sharecropping suffered from the high
costs associated with dividing the harvest (Carmona and Simpson (2010)).
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from 76 litres in 1850-1854 to 108 litres in 1890-1894 and reaching 168 litres
in 1900-1904 (Nourrisson 1990, p. 321). As the distance between the producer
and consumer increased, so did the economic power of the merchants, who
were able to purchase their wines over an increasingly large area. However,
the nature of political institutions and the political voice of thousands of small
producers also changed and, in France, this enabled them to achieve favour-
able legislation to establish cooperatives and regional appellations, helping
producers to wrest back some of the market power from the merchants
(Simpson 2005).
The growth in French consumption was all the more impressive because
of the devastation wrought by the vine disease phylloxera, which in time
killed most of the world’s vines. The only permanent solution involved
replanting and grafting European varieties on phylloxera-resistant American
rootstock6. During the 19th century, France was the country worst affected,
and output fell from an average of 57.4 million hectolitres in 1863-1875, to
31.7 million in 1879-1892, before recovering to 52.5 million in 1899-1913.
These phylloxera-induced shortages caused higher international wine prices
and encouraged growers everywhere to plant vines and increase output7.
Although phylloxera and other vine diseases forced governments to
increase expenditure on scientific research, the advances in winemaking
were as spectacular as anything achieved in the vineyards8. In hot climates,
fermentation had often ended prematurely, leaving sugar in the wines that
made them unstable and ruining them. In 1887, Paul Brame successfully
devised a system to reduce the temperature by pumping the must through
tubes which were immersed in water. The last decade of the 19th century and
the first of the 20th saw major investment in new wineries in hot climates
incorporating the latest technologies such as refrigeration, continuous
presses, aero-crushing turbines, sterilizers and pasteurizers, which helped
create economies of scale in a number of important areas9. First, consider-
able skills were required to control the temperature of the must during
fermentation, correct its acidity and use cultivated yeasts to produce a dry
table wine which would keep. Second, new winemaking technologies and
cellar designs helped cut labour costs, an important consideration in high-
wage economies such as those found in the New World. Third, more wine
was extracted from the grapes. Fourth, merchants demanded large quantities
of wines of uniform style that could be repeated each year, which was
impossible for small producers to achieve. Finally, some of the large wineries
6 For the history of phylloxera, see especially Campbell (2004), Paul (1996) and Pouget (1990).
7 For Spain, Pan-Montojo (1994); Italy Loube`re (1978); and Algeria, Isnard (1954) and Birebent
(2007).
8 Paul (1996) and Simpson (forthcoming), chapter 2.
9 Isnard (1954, pp. 189-190). For similar advances in Australia at this time, see Simpson
(forthcoming).
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diversified into distilling and the production of brandy and fortified wines
where the economies of scale were even greater.
These new winemaking technologies led to a shift in the locus of pro-
duction of cheap table wines from Europe’s centre to its southern periphery.
In particular, France’s four Midi departments (Aude, Gard, He´rault and
Pyrenees Orientales) and Algeria saw their output increase from the
equivalent of less than 15 per cent of domestic consumption in the 1820s to
50 per cent by 191010. The new technology was also crucial for the expansion
of New World viticulture. In California, wine production increased fourfold
between 1891-1893 and 1911-1914, and in Mendoza the area of vines
increased from 22,875 hectares in 1904 to 57,764 in 1912, and output jumped
fourfold in the decade after 1904 (Table 1). By contrast, in Australia the new
technologies helped capture new export markets rather than increase output
(Osmond and Anderson 1998, p. 41).
The new wineries required large quantities of grapes and offered the
greatest returns to producers in hot climates, which explains why they were
rare in much of Europe. As late as 1934, some 86.5 per cent of all French
wine production outside the Midi was still found in wineries producing less
than 400 hectolitres, a quantity that could be supplied from many family
vineyards (Galet 2004, calculated in Simpson, forthcoming). By contrast, in
the New World, and to a lesser extent in Algeria and some parts of the Midi,
large wineries dominated production by the early 20th century11. Some of the
New World wineries had a considerably greater capacity than 10,000 hecto-
litres. In Mendoza, the ten largest firms produced 445,000 hectolitres or a third
of the output, while in South Australia the figure was more than two-thirds,
although this was a relatively modest 78,000 hectolitres (Tables 2 and 3)12. In
Mendoza, the number of firms producing more than 10,000 hectolitres jumped
from 18 to 96 between 1900 and 1914 when the three largest firms produced
350,000 hectolitres, requiring grapes from about 6,000 hectares (Barrio de
Villanueva 2009, pp. 5-7)13. In California, the Italian Swiss Company (owned
by the California Wine Association) produced 225,000 hectolitres from
eight different wineries in 1911, while the California Wine Association’s huge
«Winehaven» complex in Richmond had storage for 378,000 hectolitres
10 Algeria became an integral part of France after 1848, and Algie`rs, Oran and Constantine were
organized as French de´partements.
11 In the Midi, there were 130 wineries by 1903 with a minimum capacity of 10,000 hectolitres
each, the equivalent of one for every 180,000 hectolitres of wine produced, implying that smaller
wineries remained very much the predominant form of production. In Algeria, there were 53 large
wineries, equivalent to one for every 145,000 hectolitres, while in Mendoza the figure was 34
wineries, and one for every 40,000. Gervais (1903), my calculations and Barrio de Villanueva (2008a
cuadro 1). The Midi’s harvest is taken as 23.4 million hectolitres for this year.
12 Four of these Mendoza firms had two wineries. Ibid. (cuadro 1) and for South Australia,
Whitington (1903, p. 71)
13 A yield of 60 hectolitres per hectare is assumed.
JAMES SIMPSON
46 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
TABLE 1
LEADING WINE PRODUCING COUNTRIES BEFORE 1914
Wine production in millions of hectolitres
1865-74 1885-94 1909-13 Per cent of total in 1909-13
France 55.4 31.9 46.4 31.4
Italy 23.6 31.9 46.0 31.2
Spain 17.1 21.9 14.9 10.1
Austria–Hungary 3.2 7.7 7.9 5.4
Portugal 2.1 4.3 4.8 3.3
Greece 0.2 1.8 3.2 2.2
Germany 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.2
Russia 3.3 3.5 1.4* 0.9*
Rumania 0.1 2.8 1.4 0.9
Bulgaria 0.8 0.5
Other European 0.9 0.6
European total 129.5 87.8
Algeria 0.2 3.1 7.9 5.4
Argentina n.a. n.a. 4.4 3.0
Chile n.a. n.a 2.0 1.4
United States 0.3 1.0 1.9 1.3
Russia (Asia) 0.9 0.6
South Africa 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2
Tunisia 0.3 0.2
Australia n.a 0.1 0.2 0.1
Other countries 5.1 15.7 0.2 0.1
Non-European producers 18.1 12.3
World 113.7 125.7 147.6 100.0
*Refers to European Russia.
Sources: 1865-74 and 1885-94, Morilla Critz (1995, p. 303); 1909-13 International Institute de
Agriculture: 1913 and 1914 (1915, pp. 110-111); and Mitchell (1995, p. 240). Except Portugal, Lains and
Sousa (1998, p. 965); Argentina, Boletı´n del Centro Vitivinı´cola, various issues and Barrio de Villanueva
(2009, p. 10); Australia, Osmond and Anderson (1998), Table 1; United States: Shear and Pearce (1934;
Table 10).
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(equivalent to about 25 per cent of California’s output), and it had wine-
manufacturing facilities for 140,000 hectolitres14.
There were few economies of scale to be exploited with grape growing,
and therefore family producers remained competitive everywhere. However,
TABLE 2
LEADING WINE-MAKERS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, 1868, 1876 AND 1903
1868 1876 1903
Vineyards
Quantity
produced
Per cent
of SA
production
Quantity
produced
Per cent
of SA
production
Quantity
produced
Per cent
of SA
production
Largest
three
1,637 4.4 4,546 20.3 42,960 37.0
Largest
five
2,546 6.9 6,428 28.7 57,962 49.9
Largest
ten
5,231 14.2 9,966 44.4 78,191 67.4
Total state
vintage
36,919 22,422 116,082
SA, South Australia.
Quantities in hectoliters.
Sources: Bell (1993; Table 3) and Whitington (1903, p. 71).
TABLE 3
LEADING WINERIES IN MENDOZA, 1903
Tomba y hijos 91,150 hectolitres
Gio y Gargantini 58,235
Balbino Arizu hijos 57,022
Testentarı´a Honorio Barraquero 54,754
Germania S.A. 38,614
Borel y Calise 36,153
Miguel Escorihuela (two wineries) 34,646
Trapiche S.A. (two wineries) 22,784
Source: Diario El Comerico (October 27, 1903, p. 2) cited in Barrio de Villanueva (2008a, cuadro 1).
14 Peninou and Unzelman (2000, p. 104). Another California company, the Italian Vineyard
Company, had 2,000 hectares of vines and wineries with a capacity of almost 20 million litres
(Pinney 1989, p. 362).
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while in the Old World grape and wine production remained integrated, in
the New World they were often specialist activities by 190015. In California,
the Pacific Wine and Spirits Review noted that most growers sold their grapes
to wine-makers, «except to a limited extent in some of the older districts»,
whereas previously nearly every vineyard had had its own fermenting house
and storage cellar. Thomas Hardy, a leading producer in South Australia,
wrote as early as 1882 that «the manufacture of wine is now almost wholly
gone into the hands of those who make a business of it, and do not follow
it merely as a secondary pursuit»16, while in Mendoza producers bought
around three-fifths of their needs from specialist grape growers by 1908
(Centro Vitivinı´cola Nacional 1910, p. 17).
These organizational differences between Europe and the New World can
be explained by the nature of and the changes in the asset specificity of
vineyards and wineries. In Europe, grapes had to be processed very quickly,
especially if they were diseased, and growers could not risk having to find
buyers at short notice. By contrast, in the New World climatic conditions
made the vines much easier to grow, harvest failures and disease were rare,
and the grapes were of a consistent quality with high levels of sugar17.
Growers in California and Australia sometimes produced the «three way»
grape, allowing them to decide after the harvest whether to sell them for
wine, raisins or the table, while in Argentina growers could leave their grapes
on the vines for 3 or 4 months before selling them (Pacottet 1911, p. 78).
This suggests that specialist grape growers in the New World were less
vulnerable than winery owners to problems of hold-up, despite the fact
that the latter frequently colluded to set prices. This was especially true in
Australia and California because of the better quality wines they produced, as
wine-makers needed a guaranteed supply of adequate grapes when markets
recovered. Possibilities of exit were also easier to growers than to wine-
makers, as alternative and often attractive employment opportunities
were available nearby in the large, diverse economies of San Francisco and
Melbourne. Mendoza, by contrast, was a thousand kilometres from Buenos
Aires, but the growers here benefited from significantly greater yields
15 This was generally true even in the Midi (and Algeria), where the new winemaking tech-
nologies produced what one writer termed la viticulture industrielle Auge´-Laribe´ (1907). For a dis-
cussion on how transaction costs associated with using wage labour on wine estates was reduced,
see Simpson (2005).
16 Pacific Wine & Spirits Review (December 1906, p. 43) and Aeuckens (1988, p. 148). By 1900,
for example, Hardy’s had 500 acres of vines and brought grapes from 500 or 600 more, the property
of some thirty or forty independent growers. Hardy also noted that «I reckon we have done more in
advancing the science of winemaking during the last 5 years than we did in 20 years before» Victoria
(1900, pp. 38-39).
17 In Victoria, for example, new vines became productive after 3 rather than the 4 or 5 years in
Europe, and the hot climates reduced considerably the incidence of vine disease (and consequent
expenditure on chemicals), and allowed high-quality grapes rich in sugars to be produced each year
(Castella 1886, p. 17).
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because of irrigation, and market downturns, at least prior to 1914, were
short so that many growers carried low levels of debt18.
The separation of grape growing and winemaking nevertheless created
new coordination problems. Market volatility was common in all wine
regions because if high prices encouraged the planting of new vineyards,
market conditions might be very different when these became productive
3 or 4 years later. The high fixed costs along the commodity chain implied
that grape prices in Mendoza, for example, could double or halve from one
harvest to the next, while wine prices in Buenos Aires fluctuated much less
(La Prensa, 12 abril 1914, p. 11). The fact that grape production and wine-
making were usually integrated in a single business in Europe resulted in
producers expanding capacity in both areas in response to market upturns.
In the New World, growers and winery owners faced different investment
incentives. The creation of new vineyards required relatively little capital and
smallholders could plant vines working during periods of low seasonal
demand for wage labour. By contrast, the high capital cost of the new wineries
implied that investment was linked to credit availability. This separate own-
ership of vines and winemaking facilities often led to unbalanced growth
between the two sectors, because if large wineries failed to purchase grapes
from independent producers because of low prices, growers could crush them
themselves so that aggregate wine supply was not diminished, although
quality dropped. Therefore, the new capital-intensive wineries required not
just a secure supply of grapes, but also a market for their wines.
Another major problem was fraud. Fraud had always been present in food
and beverage markets, but it changed significantly over the second half of the
19th century because of the growing physical separation between producers
and consumers and the development of new preservatives that allowed
manufacturers to mask food deterioration and lower costs, often making
food adulteration imperceptible to consumers. As Marc Law and Gary
Libecap note (2006, p. 321), science increased the complexity of products
and «created opportunities for cost-saving deception by some firms through
adulteration of their products in ways that consumers could not easily per-
ceive». Firms were naturally reluctant to invest capital in state-of-the-art
winemaking facilities, brand names and advertising if they were going to
have to compete with «wines» made from a variety of concoctions and sold
in «fancy bottles» at considerably lower prices.
Finally, although the flow of ideas and technology across national borders
was increasing in 1900, international wine trade was limited, especially after
French growers replanted after phylloxera. As Table 4 shows, tariffs every-
where were high compared with average wine prices in France because taxes
18 La Prensa (10 abril 1914, p. 9), for example, noted that the new growers suffered most as their
vines had just started producing. Sharecroppers (contratistas) were also partly protected because
they received a fixed salary.
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on all types of alcohol were a major part of national (and often local)
revenue. Most countries preferred to use excise taxes on domestic output
rather than encourage imports to provide these revenues, which would also
have led to greater competition for domestic producers of alcoholic bev-
erages. The new industries in both Argentina and California were therefore
able to benefit significantly from import substitution, although this was not
the case in Australia where domestic demand for wine was always very small
(Figure 1 and Table 5).
4. CALIFORNIA
There were four major players in the Californian wine industry in the late
19th century: grape producers, wine-makers, San Francisco shippers and the
East Coast bottlers and distributors19. The rapid growth of the national
market demanded coordination between businesses so that the high levels of
capital investment in vineyards and winemaking equipment were not left
TABLE 4
LEVEL OF TARIFFS ON WINE IMPORTS, 1898
Francs per hectolitre
New South Wales 138
Victoria 165
South Australia 165
United Kingdom 28
Argentina 40
Chile 125
France 20
Italy 20
Spain 50
United States 55
French wine price (1896-99) 26
Figures are for ordinary red wine. The French figure ranges from 12 francs for wines of up to
10 degrees alcohol, to 20 francs for those of 15 degrees.
Sources: Cocks and Fe´ret (1898, pp. 775-784); for France: Sempe´ (1898, p. 196) and France annuaire
1938 (1939, pp. 62-63).
19 This section is a summary of Simpson (2008).
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idle. Faced with falling prices and widespread adulteration of wines, the
small wine makers established the California Wine-Makers Corporation
(CWMC) in 1894 which entered into a 5-year agreement to sell their wine to
the California Wine Association (CWA), another combine created in the
same year by the leading West Coast wine dealers. By 1897, the CWMC
represented 80 per cent of California’s wine-producers while the CWA had
80 per cent of the wine (Peninou and Unzelman 2000, p. 79). However, post-
contractual opportunistic behaviour led to a «wine war» between the two
organizations, with the CWA supposedly refusing to pay the prices previously
agreed and the CWMA selling large quantities of wine directly to a New York
merchant rather than through the San Francisco merchants in violation of its
contract. After its legal defeat in 1899, the CWMC disappeared, leaving the
field to the CWA20. According to a recent study, between 1894 and Prohibi-
tion the CWA would «cultivate more vineyard acreage, crush more grapes
annually, operate more wineries, make more wine and have a greater wine
FIGURE 1
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN WINE
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Sources: see Table 5.
20 Attempts to establish another growers’ combine to control a minimum of 80 per cent of the
crop also failed. Pacific Rural Press (July 8, 1899, p. 30).
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storage capacity than any other wine concern in the world» (Peninou and
Unzelman 2000, p. 33)21. This was horizontal consolidation and vertical
integration — from grape growing to distribution — on a massive scale and
led Andre´ Simon (1919, p. 105) to write that «in the old world, winemaking is
an art; in America, it is an industry».
Consolidations to escape price competition were common in the United
States in the capital-intensive, mass-production industries in which «firms
were closely matched and in which expansion had been rapid on the eve of
the Panic of 1893» (Lamoreaux 1985, pp. 45 and 87). The heterogeneity
of wine makes the possibilities of collusion in the wine market difficult, but
by integrating forwards and controlling distribution, the CWA was able to
guarantee that the wine was not adulterated. This provided not only the
necessary market stability for it to invest in brand names but also a guarantee
for consumers that the wines were not adulterated22. The objective of the
CWA was not to produce fine wines but to develop a mass market for stable
and unadulterated ones, which it could sell to American consumers under
the protection of high tariffs. As Amerine and Singleton (1976, p. 286) would
later write, the company «never sold a bad bottle of wine», but neither did it
sell a «great bottle». Percy Morgan, who for many years was the CWA’s
chairman, noted in 1917 that forward integration helped create new markets
for California’s wines:
Until the coming of the California Wine Association only a few wine-
ries tried to deliver their original packages direct to the consumer
and build up a following for their label. The large dealer almost always
sold California wines in bulk to distant jobbers who either bottled
them with a domestic or foreign label known to their particular
TABLE 5
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, TRADE AND CONSUMPTION, 1909-13
Production Imports Exports
Domestic
consumption
Per capita
consumption litres/year
Argentina 2,937 426 3,363 48.5
Australia 246 6 41 211 4.7
United States 2,005 280 2,248 2.4
Figures in thousands of hectolitres, except per capita consumption.
Sources: Argentina and Australia (Table 1); California, Shear and Pearce (1934; Table 6).
21 However, Percy Morgan himself recognized the advantages of small, independent grape
producers (Morgan 1902, p. 95).
22 Wines were sold under labels such as Brun & Chaix, De Turk, Greystone, Italian Swiss
Colony (Pinney 2005, p. 8).
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localities, or sold them to retailers who pursued a similar course.
Moreover, these distributors and retailers had neither the knowledge
not the facilities to age and handle wines properly. Only a large firm
with capital could select from millions of gallons, blend to standards,
market under labels that could gain the confidence of the public, and
stand back of the label wherever sold (cited in Peninou and Unzelman
2000, p. 125).
There is little doubt that the CWA used its market power to fix grape and
wine prices, but the rapid growth in the industry between 1894 and 1914 also
suggests that all sectors of the industry benefited. Indeed, family growers in
California probably suffered less during the turbulent 1900s than any other
wine-growing region in the world, and the CWA’s dependence on them was
recognized by Percy Morgan:
y it is not from these great tracts that the larger portion of the ton-
nage for wine purposes will be derived. It is from the small vineyardist,
cultivating from ten to fifty acres (four to twenty hectares); cultivating
and looking after his lands individually, and thereby obtaining from
30 per cent to 50 per cent more tonnage to the acre than is possible
from the great vineyard tracts, that the very remunerative results will
accrue23.
In conclusion, the heavy investment by the CWA in production facilities
and brands raised the entry costs for independent wine producers. Limited
competition came from a handful of small independent wineries which
began to specialize in fine wines in the Napa region, while at the other
extreme San Francisco’s Italian community sometimes preferred to buy
grapes which they used to produce home-made wines, a practice which
became even more important under Prohibition, when the area of vines
actually doubled (Lapsley 1996, pp. 67-68; Heintz 1990; Pinney 2005, p. 18)24.
Competition to the CWA came from the large breweries and distillers rather
than from other wine producers. California’s wine production increased by a
factor of four between 1891-1893 and 1911-1994, but while dessert wine
production multiplied ninefold, that of dry table wines rose by just a third
(California State Agricultural Society 1915, p. 139). Dessert wines were less
likely to deteriorate, whether left on retailers’ shelves or in consumers’
decanters, and because they were often sweet, found greater acceptance
among North European immigrants. For the CWA, there were important
economies of scale, especially in creating large batches of homogeneous
wines to brand and fortifying wines using domestic grape brandy, which
23 Morgan (1902, p. 95) reproduces an earlier article in the Sacramento Bee.
24 Under Prohibition, it was illegal to sell wine but not to possess or consume it.
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avoided the $1.10 a gallon brandy tax. This made fortified wines the cheapest
form of alcohol in the market, allowing the CWA to distil their poorer wines
profitably and compete with other alcoholic beverages (Seff and Cooney
1984, p. 418).
5. AUSTRALIA
The Australian wine industry was the only one in the New World with an
important export trade, accounting for about a fifth of national production in
the period 1909-1913 and with virtually all being sold to the United Kingdom
(Australian Vigneron, March 1902, p. 236). The high quality of these dry,
unfortified red wines allowed them to be marketed using brand names, a
feature virtually unknown among European producers of vin ordinaire.
However, the quantity of wine involved was relatively small, peaking in 1902
at 4.5 million litres, equivalent to just half the output of Argentina’s largest
producer at this time.
In California, the high entry costs to marketing wines on the U.S. East
Coast before Prohibition were reduced by the CWA, as a producer-led
commodity chain. By contrast, it was a market-led chain which was created
to sell Australian wines in London25. Australia’s high internal tariffs before
Federation in 1901 made commercial producers look to the British market
some 20,000 kilometres away, even though freight costs were approximately
three times greater than those facing French exporters26. In addition, the
long sea voyage and the extremes in temperature meant that all wines,
especially the young ones and those «that have not been thoroughly well
made», underwent a «very considerable and detrimental change» (Australian
Vigneron, July 1892, p. 47). Imported wines required several months’ rest
on their arrival and faulty or young wines were often permanently ruined.
These quality changes caused major problems for the trade. One prominent
London West End merchant, who reportedly imported sixty hogsheads of
South Australian wine because of its growing popularity, claimed it was
so «ill-fermented» that he resolved never to import any more direct from
Australia (Australian Vigneron, October 1893, p. 114). For this particular late
19th century market to work, trusted agents were required at both ends of
the chain: in Australia to check that only well-made wines were shipped; and
in London to determine the appropriate remedies to correct the wines on
their arrival.
Trade was dominated by two major London houses that specialized in
Australian wines: Walter Pownall, and in particular Peter Burgoyne, who
25 At this time, Australia exported dry red table wine referred to as a «Burgundy type», some-
where «between the heavily fortified wines on the one hand, and light wines, such as clarets and
hocks on the other» to the United Kingdom. Australian Vigneron (March 1902, p. 236).
26 Ibid. (July 1892, p. 48). Victoria (1900, p. 12) for Australia’s internal tariffs.
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claimed in 1900 that over the previous 30 years «fully 70 per cent of the
wine exported from Australia to England had passed through his hands»
(Australian Vigneron, September 1900, p. 115). In 1893, Burgoyne bought the
Mount Ophir vineyard (Victoria), and investment in new wine-making
facilities from the turn of the century led one commentator to report that
«it would be difficult to find in any part of the world a winery in which
California labor saving appliances and the most approved European methods
of securing the best treatment of the wine are so completely adopted». Large
quantities of grapes and wine were brought also from other producers to be
blended to create a standard product that was exported after 19 months.
Burgoyne’s agents selected wines in Australia, while in London the firm had
around 4500 hogsheads of wine in bond and a similar quantity at the Pelham
Street premises in 1912. Wines were sold by the cask and the bottle using
the Ophir (Burgoyne) and Emu (Pownall) brands. «Burgoyne’s Australian
Wine» placards were found «on every railway station in England», and the
company claimed to have invested £300,000 in advertising. The chain was
completed when, from the turn of the century, Burgoyne started a retail trade
in Australia itself (Simpson forthcoming).
The rapid advances in these winemaking technologies, the stranglehold
enjoyed by Burgoyne over the British market, the slow growth of the industry
and the large quantity of poor wines still being produced27 led to both the
South Australian and Victorian governments holding parliamentary enqui-
ries into how to organize the industry at the beginning of the 20th century. In
particular, they discussed the potential advantages of establishing district
cooperative wineries for small growers, «central cellars» in Adelaide and
Melbourne to blend and create standard wine types, and a London depot to
compete directly with Burgoyne. We shall look at each very briefly.
The separation of growing and winemaking activities was less apparent
outside South Australia28. In Victoria, production was small scale, and 2,382
growers cultivated just 1,123 hectares of vines in 1900, with just 72 holdings
larger than 20 hectares (Victoria 1900, p. 5). Many of these growers had
responded to the State incentives of a £5 bonus payment per hectare to plant
27 Contemporaries distinguished between two types of wines being produced — «very good red,
full-bodied wines» for export, and poorly made, often diseased and fortified wines for the domestic
markets. See, for example, Victoria (1900, pp. 33, 34 and 38).
28 The advantages of vertical integration were hotly debated, and Arthur Perkins, the Govern-
ment Viticulturist for South Australia, spoke of «two separate classes with antagonistic interests —
vignerons on the one hand, wine-makers on the other», and suggested that this was the cause of the
slow growth of the State’s viticulture. Australian Vigneron (January 1899, p. 169). By contrast,
Raymond Dubois, the Principal of the Viticultural College at Rutherglen in Victoria, argued that
only the new winemaking technologies could produce quality table wines, and the State’s poor
wines were the result of using poor equipment and production methods on small vineyards, and
Romeo Bragato, the Victorian Government’s viticultural expert, reported that «one of the chief
drawbacks of the industryy is the fact that a man who grows grapes thinks he can also make wine»
(Victoria 1900, pp. 21, 33).
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vines, but their lack of wine-making skills and capital resulted in poor quality
wines being produced. Growers planted vines but did not build cellars and
attempts at creating four subsidized district wineries failed, largely because
there were few incentives for growers to improve quality. These were not
cooperatives where growers provided their own capital and took responsi-
bility themselves for rejecting substandard grapes or wine, as was the case
with the Danish dairy cooperatives at the time (Henriksen 1999). However,
while district wineries failed to encourage producers to improve product
quality, their presence provided competition to private wine businesses that
strongly opposed them29.
The control of the British market by Burgoyne was also deeply resented
by many, and as early as 1894, the South Australian government created a
wine depot in London to provide an alternative outlet for domestic produ-
cers. The depot did not legally own the wines, so it could not blend them to
create homogeneous products in sufficient volume to brand and instead had
to match each individual shipment with a different purchaser. The depot’s
manager therefore entered into an agreement with a London merchant to sell
the wine, which resulted in considerable opposition from Burgoyne and the
London trade press and led to a trade boycott by merchants in the United
Kingdom30. Although the depot claimed to have sold South Australian wine
to over 4,000 customers by 1900, «including most of the best wholesale
houses in London and the provinces, large wine merchants and grocers, as
well as a number of high-class restaurants and clubs», and sales increased
threefold over 5 years, these remained just a fifth of what Burgoyne handled
(South Australia 1901, p. iii). Burgoyne responded to the debates over the
depots in 1900 and 1901 by threatening to buy wines only after their arrival
in London rather than in Australia, thereby passing more of the risk onto the
domestic producers. The leading producers were forced to back down, the
South Australia depot was wound up and Victoria’s never established. In
1911, Burgoyne (2.7 million litres) and Pownall (750,000) still dominated
exports from South Australia and Victoria, although the British retailer
Gilbey (625,000) was now in a close third31. Although just as in California, in
the domestic market the large Australian producers became increasingly
interested in dessert wines after 1900 because of the production and mar-
keting advantages that they offered.
29 Victoria (1900), see especially the reports by Thomas Blayney and Rome Bragato.
30 South Australia (1901, pp. 68, 2297). Thomas Hardy noted that «the large buyers would
not touch the depot». By 1900, it had lost £26,000 «mainly in connection with the wine trade». Ibid.
(p. iii).
31 Australian Vigneron (1912 January, p. 25 and February, p. 71). Figures are only approximate.
The attempts by both Gilbey and Lipton, the giant British retailer with a reportedly 3,000 outlets, to
obtain financial backing from the Victorian government in exchange for establishing a depot in
Melbourne to collect wines for the British market were unsuccessful.
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6. ARGENTINA
The population of Argentina multiplied fivefold to eight million in the half
century before 1914, with a high percentage being immigrants or their des-
cendants originating from Italy, Spain or France. Many potential consumers,
then, were already accustomed to drinking wine rather than beer or spirits.
Growing conditions for grapes in Mendoza, which accounted for four-fifths
of the nation’s production in 1902-1903, were exceptional. Once the region
had been connected by rail with Buenos Aires (1884) and wine-makers had
learnt the art of fermenting their wines properly in the hot climate, the
possibility of firms selling large quantities of good quality branded wines in a
rapidly growing market appeared endless. With the exception of Algeria,
Argentina’s wine industry grew more and faster than anywhere else in the
world between 1885 and 1914. Yet contemporaries found little to praise
as the industry suffered two major recessions in a decade in the early
20th century. Wine quality remained poor and per capita wine consumption
was less than half the figure found in France.
The 1901-1903 crisis highlighted a number of structural problems facing
the industry. Most of the wine produced and consumed in Argentina
was strong, young, coarse and inferior to those produced in Australia or
California32. Pioneers of change, such as Eugene Hilgard or George Husmann
in California, or Thomas Hardy and Arthur Perkins in South Australia, had
no equivalents in Mendoza. However, just as in France, Italy or Spain,
Argentina’s producers were responding to a different type of market, one
in which consumers’ preference was for strong, cheap wines. The industry
was dominated by a dozen or two large firms at the time, with the Tomba
winery being the largest producing 91,250 hectolitres (almost 7 per cent of
Mendoza’s total), and equivalent to approximately 1,500 hectares of vines in
full production, followed by the Giol y Gargantini winery with 58,255 hecto-
litres, and Arizu with 57,022 hectolitres. The large wineries reacted to the
collapse in demand in 1902 by refusing to buy grapes from small producers,
who were forced to open old cellars and sell their wine immediately after
fermentation because of their lack of credit and storage facilities33. As a
result, supply was not diminished and the poor quality of many wines made
adulteration easy. Unlike producer countries in Europe, a high share of
Argentina’s production was concentrated in a single geographical area,
32 For example, while Australia was sending unfortified wines to Britain, an Argentine com-
mission discussed whether spirits needed to be added when wines were sent to Buenos Aires. Arata
et al. (1904). Wines were rarely matured for more than a month or two and virtually all were sold
within the year. Kaerger (1901) cited in Barrio de Villanueva (2009, p. 169). See also Simois and
Lavenir (1903, p. 127) and Arata (1903, p. 202).
33 There were reportedly 1,742 wineries in operation in 1902 compared with 1,082 in 1899,
and 1,010 in 1907. Barrio de Villanueva (2009 cuadro 6). For the presence of small wineries in
California, see Pinney (1989, p. 362).
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which resulted in the leading producers having considerable political back-
ing from Mendoza’s provincial government, but much less from national
politicians. The collapse in prices, the abysmal quality of the wines in 1902
and the threat of some politicians in Buenos Aires to reduce tariffs on Chi-
lean wine imports pushed the large producers and local government into
action, and a national commission was created to investigate the industry’s
problems. It included provisions for inspecting wine cellars and resulted in
the destruction of diseased and adulterated wines34.
The difficulties facing the industry led to some large producers con-
templating not just the creation of an independent regulatory agency to
control adulteration, but also a trust that would restrict supply by buying
surplus wines when necessary35. However, there were major obstacles to the
creation of a wine trust such as California’s CWA, not because the institu-
tional regime in Argentina was so different from that in the United States,
but rather because wine was considered by national politicians as a basic
part of the labourers’ diets36. Opposition to a monopoly therefore came not
just from grape growers, but also from politicians in Buenos Aires who from
time to time threatened to reduce tariffs on Chilean «pure wines» in
exchange for allowing livestock exports37. Higher prices caused by a mono-
poly would also have threatened Mendoza’s comparative advantage because
it would have encouraged viticulture in other states, just as Mendoza’s high
taxation did in the interwar period. Finally, a trust which did not include
all the major wineries risked problems associated with public goods and
the free rider, namely independent local producers who did not contribute to
the costs of regulating the market, increasing their output to benefit from the
higher prices. The Argentine industry had low entry barriers because of the
poor quality of most wines. By the autumn of 1903, the promise of higher
grape and wine prices following the February harvest ended the debates, and
the industry enjoyed another decade of rapid growth.
Wine quality undoubtedly improved in the first decade of the 20th century,
but producers lacked the market discipline found in Australia and California
of having to sell to occasional, rather than habitual, wine drinkers. A handful
34 Elı´as Villanueva was Mendoza’s provincial governor and the eleventh most important wine
producer, and when his manager refused permission for the destruction of 1,000 hectolitres of spoilt
wine, this led to a second visit by the Commission, when some 500 hectolitres were finally removed.
See especially Barrio de Villanueva (2008b, p. 336).
35 For the various projects discussed, see especially Barrio de Villanueva (2006, pp. 190-198)
and Mateu (2007, pp. 14-15).
36 In the wider Argentine economy, as in the United States, industrial supply «moved towards
«trustification»y, capital concentration and big business» during the first decade of the 20th century
(Rocchi 2006, p. 9).
37 The leading Mendocino newspaper described a trust as both «ridiculous» and «impossible»
Los Andes, (21 August 1901, p. 4), while the Buenos Aires newspaper, La Nacio´n, warned of the
dangers of a «cooperative» organized by «speculators» among wine producers, which claimed to
protect the interests of the industry, consumers and government. Ibid. (January 15, 1903).
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of firms did begin to sell branded wines before 1900, and the number
increased to 36 during the first decade of the new century38, resulting in a
much greater percentage of ordinary table wines being sold under producer
names in Buenos Aires than in Paris or Madrid. As one contemporary noted,
unlike France there was no strict division between industry and commerce,
and Mendoza’s large wineries used their own intermediaries to sell their
wines directly to consumers in the large centres of consumption (Alazraqui
1911, p. 85)39.
Despite the growing use of brands, contemporaries bemoaned the fact
that there was little to distinguish between the wines of the major producers,
in part because of the widespread use of the malbec grape variety40. Product
uniformity and collusion between the leading producers led to minimal price
differences between the leading houses, although brands did offer some
guarantee that it would be the consumer, rather than an intermediary, who
added the water. Table 6 lists some of the leading wineries and their brands
and shows that these were sold in Mendoza for about a third more than the
«vinos de traslado». These were wines produced in small wineries by inde-
pendent growers and sold immediately after fermentation to be blended with
the produce of the big houses to meet their orders. The large wineries
therefore adjusted their supply to meet the demand for their branded wines
in the final market both through grape and wine purchases. Unfortunately,
the golondrinas did not drink branded wine in Italy, and they were unwilling
to pay a high premium for it in Argentina41.
After a decade of rapid growth, exogenous factors led to a fall in GDP of
10 per cent and the overnight disappearance of credit facilities. Once again,
Mendoza’s large wine producers failed to buy grapes from independent
producers who reopened wineries and flooded the Buenos Aires market with
wines that were still «hot» after fermenting, leading to a collapse in prices for
both branded and unbranded products. The leading wineries tried to shift the
adjustment costs to other sectors. Attempts to control wine prices failed, both
because of the problems of free riders, but also because higher wine prices
fed back into higher demand for grapes and led to a renewed growth in
planting and even greater overproduction a few years later. Instead, leading
38 Barrio de Villanueva (2003, pp. 39, 42) and Richard Jorba (1998, p. 306). One of the functions
of the Centro Vitivinı´cola Nacional was to facilitate the registration of brands by producers.
39 Jose´ Trianes wrote that «Para vender lo que venden aquı´ dos docenas de los llamados viti-
vinicultores se necesita en Francia un centenar de comerciantes con un centenar de millones de
francos en efectivo que han de comprar el producto de algunos millares de cosecheros» (Trianes
1908, p. 26).
40 Galanti (1900, pp. 26-27), Simois and Lavenir (1903, p. 200), Galanti (1915, p. 34) and Boletı´n
Centro Vitivinı´cola Nacional (dic. 1910, p. 1671). For the 1930s, see Trianes (1935), cited in Mateu
and Stein (2008, p. 157).
41 As one historian has noted, producers catered for «an expanding mass of consumers who
demanded nothing more than a minimally palatable, abundant, low-priced and often adulterated
product» (Stein 2007, p. 105).
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wineries now colluded to keep grape prices artificially low, at a little more
than a peso per 42 kilograms between 1914 and 1919, when in 1912 and 1913
they had been 4.5 and 3.5 pesos, respectively. This price hardly covered
variable production costs in the vineyards and thereby reduced the incentives
to increase the supply of grapes by new plantings42.
Instead of a trust along the lines of the CWA, the leading producers looked
to the Provincial government to stabilize the sector using government
funds43. A number of schemes were debated, but the Mendoza law of 1916
(ley 703) was the most controversial. It created a «cooperative» that allowed
the leading wineries access to taxes to remove unwanted production from the
market. Past attempts to create voluntary organizations to control supply
had failed because insufficient producers were willing to participate, so a
punitive tax was levied on the production of those who remained outside the
scheme44. This «cooperative» was run by the large wineries, but its life
TABLE 6
SELECTED BRAND NAMES AND WINE PRICES IN JUNE 1910
Price — centavos per litre
Winery Brand Mendoza Buenos Aires
Domingo Tomba Tomba 0.27* 0.32*
Giol & Gargantini Toro 0.27
Sociedad Bodegas Arizu´ Arizu´ 0.275 0.32
Honorio Barraquero Baco 0.25*
Sociedad Germania Cigu¨ena 0.24
B.y C. del Bono 0.23
Herwig & Cia. Perdiz 0.25
Red wine in general ‘sobre wagon’ 23-27
Vinos de ‘traslado’ from winery 15.0-17.0
*New barrels.
Source: Boletı´n Centro Vitivinı´cola Nacional (junio 1910, p. 1516).
42 The area of vines officially increased during this period, but this appears to reflect the poor
quality of official statistics rather than growers increasing the area.
43 The leading growers enjoyed close links with the Provincial Government, and the industry
produced as much as a half of the province’s tax revenue and still accounted directly for 60 per cent
of Mendoza’s gross industrial output in 1914. Richard Jorba (2008, p. 7) writes that viticulture
allowed the province «an important degree of independence» with respect to the Federal Govern-
ment, as does Coria Lo´pez (2008, anexo viii). Local industries were also highly dependent on the
sector. See especially Pe´rez Romagnoli (2006).
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proved short as the Supreme National Court determined it unconstitutional
because a Provincial Government could not create a monopoly45.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper argues that because grape quality was both inferior and highly
volatile in Europe, growers could not guarantee a market for their grapes and
therefore made the wine themselves. In the NewWorld, this was not the case,
and these activities were often carried out by separate entities with wine-
makers taking advantage of new technologies which greatly increased the
scale of operations. Differences in the organization of winemaking and
selling in the New World can be attributable to wine quality and this in turn
to consumer demand. Many consumers in California and Australia were not
accustomed to drinking wine and producers therefore had to improve and
guarantee quality, which was achieved by either a producer-driven com-
modity chain (CWA) or by a market-driven chain (Burgoyne). By contrast, in
Argentina the consumers were accustomed to drinking wine, and producers
competed on price rather than quality. The leading producers agreed on
compulsory inspections of winemaking and merchants’ properties to estab-
lish a minimum, albeit low, standard for quality.
Despite the considerable achievements between 1890 and 1914, the future
prospects for the industry on the eve of the First World War were not good.
In California, the CWA disappeared with Prohibition after several attempts to
reorganize itself. After Prohibition, when the industry effectively had to start
again from scratch, integration occurred once more, but this time it was the
out-of-state firms that moved into California and bought up the wineries
(Lapsley 1996; Pinney 2005). By contrast, in Australia the narrowness of the
domestic market made export performance especially important. Exports
peaked as early as 1902 (although a second peak in 1911 was only marginally
lower). The growth in British demand for dessert rather than dry table wines
in the interwar period was not anticipated by Burgoyne and led to the firm’s
demise, while large vertically integrated wine companies exported dessert
wines through State organized depots (Faith 2003). By the 1960s, dessert
wines accounted for half of all Australian and Californian production, and it
has only been in recent decades that the relative importance of table wines
has returned to late 19th century levels. Dessert wines were easier to brand
than dry table wines, and by the late 20th century, large-scale vertically and
44 This was set at eight pesos per hectolitre of wine and six pesos per quintal of grapes when
market prices during the previous year had been just six and three pesos, respectively (Mateu 2007,
p. 16).
45 Attempts by growers before 1914 to create cooperatives, such as those found in the Midi,
found little support with the Provincial government as they would have threatened the grape
supplies of the large wine producers.
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horizontally integrated companies in Jerez or Porto diversified their pro-
ducts, just as Seppelt did in Australia, and the CWA in the United States
before Prohibition.
By contrast, in Argentina the industry suffered severely from the 1914 to
1919 crisis. For decades, domestic consumption failed to rise much above
60 litres per person per year, and population growth slowed as immigration
declined. Although many of Mendoza’s governors were themselves wine
producers, the dependence of the Provincial government on wine encour-
aged it to try to develop alternative sources of revenues, while national
politicians threatened to reduce tariffs on imports when they thought that
wine companies were colluding or when quality deteriorated because of
fraud. In Mendoza and California, the political climate was relatively per-
missive to big business and trusts, and both regions, with less than 5 per cent
of their nation’s population, produced around 95 per cent of the domestic
wine supply. Unlike California however, wine was a basic commodity in the
Argentine diet, and the Buenos Aires government was unwilling to permit a
trust or monopoly to manipulate prices, while regulators were much less
concerned in the United States. Under Pero´n, the national policy to supply
plentiful cheap wines for the expanding middle and lower classes in urban
markets would further restrict profitability (Stein 2007, p. 102).
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